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Abstract
School finance reform in Michigan involved centralization (at the state level)
of spending decisions about schools, a large tax shift (mostly from property
to sales), and a small tax cut. The changes came about after two decades of
failed attempts to reduce property taxes in the state, and were the immediate
result of an unlikely piece of legislation that abolished all funding for public
schools. Unlike most centralized systems, foundation grants in Michigan differ
by district. Distributionally, the reforms favor residents of small, rural districts
(whose spending was increased sharply). Residents of poorer urban areas,
including Detroit, lost net income as a result of the reforms, as did residents
of some of the richest suburbs in the state. Michigan permits a number of
districts to supplement their foundation grants by limited amounts, a strategy
that we argue may be a promising way of combining the efficiency benefits of
local control with the equity benefits of foundation grant systems.
INTRODUCTION
Between the 1993–1994 school year and the 1994–1995 school year the financ-
ing and fiscal autonomy of public schools in Michigan changed radically. The
changes were of three types:
● The system became highly centralized at the state level. Except for in a
small number of districts, local spending per pupil is now determined
at the state level. Moreover, even where there is some remaining local
autonomy, the state determines a maximum level of permitted spending.
Those districts that spent the most before reform still spend the most.
● Local property taxes were sharply reduced, and a variety of state taxes
(most notably the sales tax) were increased. The net effect was a tax re-
duction.
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● Spending per pupil was substantially increased in districts (generally rela-
tively poor) where it had been lowest, and was approximately unchanged
from pre-reform levels (in real terms) in all of the other districts. In combi-
nation with the overall tax reduction, increases in average spending per
pupil imply other elements of state spending are lower than they would
have been.
In the context of Michigan’s political history around school finance and
property taxation, each of the major features of the reform was crucial to
its political success. In principle, however, the three are separable, and it is
important to recognize this. It is quite possible, for example, to reduce reliance
on property taxes without eliminating local fiscal autonomy, just as it is quite
possible to eliminate local autonomy without changing the mix of taxes to
support schools. Similarly, the state could provide increased support to low-
spending districts without also dictating the spending levels in all districts.
What Michigan got was a tax shift, a shift in the locus of fiscal control, tax
reduction, and a grandfathering of school spending levels with a dollop of
redistribution toward (mostly) the poorest districts.
In this article, we tell a story about why all of these things happened together,
make some predictions about their effects and their likely longevity, and draw
some lessons for school finance in Michigan and elsewhere. We begin with a
brief discussion of the circumstances that led up to the Michigan reforms. The
reforms themselves, or at least parts of them, may be exportable to other states,
but we will argue here that the particulars that led to radical reform of school
finance in Michigan are very unlikely to occur elsewhere. We then turn to a
discussion and evaluation of the reforms themselves.
PROPERTY TAXES AND SCHOOL FINANCE IN MICHIGAN—A BRIEF HISTORY
Prior to school finance reform, property taxes in Michigan accounted for an
unusually high fraction of state and local revenues. In the 1990–1991 school
year, for example, while overall taxes relative to personal income were about
average for the United States as a whole, Michigan was third among states
in the share of school spending financed locally (65.2 percent), behind New
Hampshire (which has virtually no state taxes), and Oregon, which has since
changed its school financing.1 Michigan property taxes as a share of personal
income had risen from 4.3 percent of personal income in 1978 to 5.0 percent
by 1991, while the national trend was one of reduced dependence on property
taxes. By the 1990s, it had become a truism of Michigan politics that property
taxes were ‘‘too high’’ and had to be reduced. As a political matter, school finance
reform was synonymous with property tax relief. Governor John Engler, a
Republican who was elected in 1990, had made a 20-percent reduction in
property taxes one of his central campaign promises.
We decline to speculate on exactly why property taxes had come to be so
unpopular. Michigan had (and continues to have) a relatively generous ‘‘circuit
breaker,’’ which reduces the net property tax burden on households whose taxes
1 U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of
Data Survey.
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exceed more than 3.5 percent of their income.2 Thus, the Michigan property tax
was considerably less regressive at low levels of income than are property taxes
in general. Whatever the reasons, the property tax was almost universally
reviled, providing motivation for the story to follow.
In addition to the property tax, other aspects of the pre-reform system of
school finance were unattractive to a number of relevant constituencies that
otherwise had relatively little in common. Many liberals were unhappy about
the fact that there was substantial variation in spending per pupil, and that the
variation was strongly correlated with school district wealth. In the 1993–1994
academic year revenues per pupil from state and local sources for general
expenditures ranged from $3404 in the Onaway Area Community School Dis-
trict (with a millage rate of 22.66) to $10,295 in Bloomfield Hills (with a millage
rate of 24.41).3 (Both of these millage rates were applied to State Equalized
Value or SEV which is constitutionally set at one-half of market value, and
which tends to be slightly less than one-half of actual market value.) Regressing
spending per pupil on SEV per pupil using data from the last year prior to
reform, we obtain a coefficient of 0.0092 with a standard error of 0.0004. The
relationship is statistically and economically significant.4
Meanwhile, voters and educators in richer districts were unhappy with the
state aid formula, which taxed them to provide school funds for the poorer
districts. Prior to reform, Michigan operated under a ‘‘power equalization’’
mechanism that provided state funds to lower wealth districts. Essentially, the
state provided a minimum tax base per pupil ($102,500 of SEV in 1993–1994)
for all districts. Districts with SEV per pupil of less than $102,500 were subsi-
dized such that each mill levied would raise $102.50 per pupil. In addition,
these districts received a foundation grant of $400 per pupil. Districts with
SEV per pupil in excess of the guarantee had their foundation grants taxed
2 Households with residents who are under age 65 receive a refundable tax credit of 65 percent
of the taxes paid in excess of 3.5 percent of income. Households with residents who are over age
65 receive a credit of 100 percent. All are subject to a cap of $1200 in tax credits, and the credit
is phased out for incomes over $73,000 a year. Renters are allowed to claim 17 percent of their
rent as property taxes.
3 These revenues include all local funds, unrestricted state funds from the power equalization
mechanism (discussed later) and those state categorical grants which were included in the founda-
tion grants under the new system (also discussed later). In our earlier study, Courant, Gramlich,
and Loeb [1995], we used current operating expenditures instead of these revenues for the analyses.
The measures differ primarily in that revenues include neither federal categorical grants nor a
number of the restricted state grants that are part of current operating expenditures. We choose
to use the revenue measure here because it is the basis used for determining funding levels under
the new system and because it makes comparison of pre- and post-reform spending levels most
straightforward. In addition, because the variation in federal and state categorical grants largely
reflects differences in the cost of providing educational services, a measure that does not include
them will provide a more accurate picture of the actual differences among districts in the level
of real expenditures per pupil. The revenue measure that we use here was not available for use
in our earlier study. District-level information on Michigan schools comes from The Integrated
Database on Michigan Education, a continuously updated resource of the School of Education,
University of Michigan.
4 The economic significance is probably somewhat overstated. In an earlier study, Courant, Gram-
lich, and Loeb [1995], we used a method developed by Ratcliffe, Riddle, and Yinger [1990] and
Downes and Pogue [1994] in order to correct for interdistrict differences in the cost of providing
educational services. We found that correcting for cost factors using data from 1992–1993 lowers
the univariate regression coefficient of per-pupil property wealth on expenditures per pupil by 12
to 23 percent, depending on specification. The relationship remains highly significant, with t-
statistics of 20.33 to 60.77, depending on specification.
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away unti it was exhausted, at which point they were on their own.5 Throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, the number of districts that received positive state aid
under the power equalization system had been falling [Fisher and Wassmer,
1995]. By 1993–1994, over 39 percent of districts, with nearly 42 percent of
all students, were above the minimum tax base, and had some or all of their
foundation grants taxed away. These ‘‘out-of-formula’’ districts were generally
not strong supporters of the pre-reform system of state aid.
Finally, during 1992–1993, the small, rural, and low-spending school district
of Kalkaska had to shut down, unable to persuade its voters to approve an
operating millage. The incident received national attention, and reinforced the
widely held view in the state that the system of school finance was in need of
major repairs.
Michigan voters and politicians were quite clear that they did not like prop-
erty taxes and that there were other weaknesses in the school finance system,
but they were unclear on what to do about it. Between 1972 and 1993, Michigan
voters rejected 12 statewide ballot proposals that would have reduced property
taxes as a source of school finance. The 1993 proposal, which would have
increased income taxes to replace reduced property taxes, was strongly sup-
ported by Governor John Engler, who was (and is) overwhelmingly popular.
It received only 45 percent of the vote. The failure of these ballot proposals is
consistent with what Cronin [1989, pp. 84–87] terms the ‘‘conventional wis-
dom’’ regarding referenda on complicated matters. Proposed changes often
start out with widespread support because people do not like the status quo,
and end up failing because voters understand the status quo and do not dislike
it enough to exchange it for something that they do not understand.
On July 20, 1993, the alternative to reform of school finance changed from
the status quo to the abolition of public schools. It is a fundamental tenet of
essentially all models of choice that the alternatives matter, and it is hard to
imagine a more radical revision in alternatives. The state senate was debating
Governor Engler’s latest proposal to reduce property taxes, via the mechanism
of reducing assessment ratios. Senator Debbie Stabenow, who was an an-
nounced candidate for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, proposed
an amendment to entirely eliminate the property tax as a source of local school
finance. At the time, Stabenow’s move was widely interpreted as an attempt
on her part to show how silly it was to cut taxes without specifying new
revenues for the schools. If that was its purpose, it backfired. The senate passed
the amended bill the same day, the house followed a day later, and the governor
immediately announced that he would sign the bill. With little debate the state
had eliminated $6.5 billion in school taxes for the 1994–1995 school year.
Absent further action, there would be no way to finance the public schools.
Local school districts had been stripped of the only revenue source under their
own control, and the state had put nothing else in its place.
After a fair amount of political maneuvering, the legislature and the governor
agreed to present the voters with two alternative mechanisms of school finance.
Contrary to many characterizations in the national press, the issue at hand
was not the choice between property taxes and sales taxes. Rather, the question
5 The formula was aidk 5 max(0, $400 1 millsk 3 ($102,500 2 Ak)), where millsk is the millage
rate for operating expenditures in district k and Ak is the actual SEV per pupil in the district. A
district with $90,000 in SEV per pupil would receive $12.50 in subsidy for every mill levied.
Symmetrically, a district with $115,000 in SEV per pupil would lose $12.50 of its foundation grant
for every mill levied. If it levied more than 32 mills, it would receive no state aid.
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Table 1. Summary of tax changes under school finance reform plans.
Tax change Pre-reform Statutory plan Proposal A
Sales and use tax 4% 4% 6%
Interstate phone calls 0% 4% 6%
Income tax 4.6% 6% 4.4%
Personal exemption $2100 $3000 $2100
Single business tax 2.35% 2.75% 2.35%
Real estate transfer tax 0.10% 0.75% 0.75%
Cigarette tax (per pack) $0.25 $0.40 $0.75
Assessment cap no no lesser of 5% or infla-
tion; adjusted to 1/2
market value on sale
K–12 school property taxes (mills)
Homestead 34 (avg.) 12 (local tax) 6 (state tax)
Second homes 34 (avg.) 24 (12 local) 24 (18 local)
Business 34 (avg.) 24 (12 local) 24 (18 local)
Hold-harmless millsa (may be levied in districts whose per-pupil
spending currently exceeds $6500)
Source: Adapted from Addonizio, Kearney, and Prince [1995, Table 1].
a ‘‘Hold-harmless mills’’ permit the highest spending districts to raise local revenue for schools.
put before the voters on March 15, 1994, concerned the mix of revenues that
would be used to replace the abolished local property tax. Voters chose between
Proposal A and a ‘‘statutory plan,’’ that, according to legislation passed on
Christmas Eve, 1993, would have been implemented had Proposal A failed.
The differences between the two plans are summarized in Table 1. Proposal
A passed by a margin of 2 to 1, carrying all 81 counties in the state. Although
the plans differ a good deal in their sources of finance, both plans would have
centralized school finance decisions and increased spending per pupil in those
districts that had previously spent the least.6
THE NEW SYSTEM
The new system ‘‘solved’’ all of the political problems with the old: The property
tax was greatly reduced, spending levels in the lowest spending districts (includ-
ing troublesome Kalkaska) were increased, and all districts were guaranteed
receipt of large foundation grants from the state—no one was out-of-formula
anymore. Moreover, because spending in essentially all districts rose slightly
or stayed the same, in real terms, the education establishment had no signifi-
cant basis on which to quarrel with the reforms.
The new Michigan system of school finance has two important features that
distinguish it from other state systems. First, the state provides foundation
6 The discerning reader will note that among the taxes that replaced the local property tax were
state and local property taxes. One reason why local taxes had to be employed in the new finance
scheme was that the state was constitutionally prohibited from raising revenue by more than
about $4.2 billion, according to a provision passed in 1979 that limits state government tax revenues
to 9.49 percent of personal income. See Addonizio, Kearney, and Prince [1995] for this and other
details of the legal and political framework in which reform took place.
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grants to all districts in amounts that vary according to each district’s
spending in the year before reform. When the plan is fully implemented,
those districts that spent the most pre-reform will receive a foundation
grant that is $1500 per pupil per year more than that received by those
districts that spent the least. Second, only a small number of districts (those
that spent the most pre-reform) are allowed to supplement their foundation
grants, and the amount of supplementation permitted also varies by district.
The combination of variable foundation grants with limited supplementation
and variable supplementation turns out to have very interesting implications
for the level and distribution of education spending in the state. In particular,
we will argue that the Michigan reforms, in contrast both to uniform
foundation grants and to systems that would allow unlimited supplementa-
tion, are likely to lead to a higher level of spending overall. Before explaining
the reasoning behind these conclusions, we need to spend a little time on
the details of the new system.7
Expenditures
The new finance system is a modified foundation grant system, in which the
state provides an operating grant to each district. In 1994–1995, the first year
of the new system, districts were divided into three groups for the purpose of
determining their foundation grants.
● The 29 K–12 districts (48,659 students) that spent less than $3950 per
pupil in 1993–1994 were given foundation grants of $4200.
● The 454 K–12 districts (1,372,359 students) that spent between $3950 and
$6500 in 1993–1994 received foundation grants that supported increases
in spending per pupil ranging from $250 for the low-spending districts in
this group to $160 for the high-spending districts.
● The 41 remaining K–12 districts (170,978 students) that spent more than
$6500 in 1993–1994 received $6660 and were allowed to raise additional
funds (termed ‘‘hold-harmless mills’’) up to the point where their total
per-pupil revenue equaled their 1993–1994 revenue plus $160.8
In all years subsequent to 1994–1995, each district’s foundation grant is
computed from a formula based on the statewide basic foundation allowance,
which was $5160 per pupil in 1994–1995. The basic foundation allowance
changes from year to year according to an index that we term the School Aid
Fund Index (SAFI). The SAFI for year t equals total statewide avenues per pupil
for all taxes that are earmarked for the School Aid Fund (see the discussion of
revenues that follows), divided by the 1994–1995 level of this ratio.
Over the next few years all districts with revenues less than the basic founda-
tion allowance will be given yearly increases under a formula that allows these
7 See our earlier paper, Courant, Gramlich, and Loeb [1995], for more details. See also Senate
Fiscal Agency [1994].
8 Only 28 of these districts raise the additional funds through local taxes. If a district has less than
350 pupils or if the tax rate they need to raise the additional funds is less than 0.05 mills, the
state provides these funds. Ten of these 41 districts with a total of 1576 students have less than
350 students, and three districts with 4597 students require less than 0.05 mills. This leaves 28
districts that raise additional funds locally.
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districts to ‘‘catch up’’ to the basic foundation allowance.9 All other districts
will receive their foundation grant of the year before, plus the dollar change
in SAFI, which was $153 between 1994–1995 and 1995–1996. Districts in the
third group, which are allowed to raise additional funds, will be limited in
their supplementation to the same nominal amount each year, the difference
between their 1993–1994 expenditure level and $6500.
The striking feature of the new system is that it tends to preserve the pre-
reform nominal differences in spending per pupil across districts. For districts
that spent more than $5000 and less than $6500 per pupil in 1993–1994 this
tendency is exact—their foundation allowances in each year will grow by the
same dollar amount. The lower spending districts will join this group after the
‘‘catch-up’’ period is completed at the end of the decade. Twenty-eight of the 41
highest spending districts are the only districts with choice over their spending
levels, and the most they are allowed to spend will preserve their pre-reform
nominal spending differences relative to other districts.
Revenue Sources
Revenues for the new system come from a variety of sources. All of the tax
increases reported in Table 1 are earmarked for the state School Aid Fund. In
addition, the School Aid Fund receives 60 percent of the revenues from the
rest of the sales tax, 14.4 percent of state income tax collections (to be increased
to 23 percent for the 1996–1997 academic year and thereafter), as well as tax
revenues from liquor, industrial and commercial facilities, and the state lottery.
In 1996–1997 these earmarked funds will cover approximately 88 percent of
the state funds required to fund the foundation grant system. Additional fund-
ing has come from a variety of one-time sources, as well as from general
revenues [Kearney, 1994; House Fiscal Agency, 1994].
For districts to participate in the new finance system and receive state funds,
they must levy an 18-mill property tax on all nonhomestead property in their
district. (Homestead property, under the new law, is an owner-occupant’s
principal residence. Nonhomestead property is all other taxable property, in-
cluding rental housing.) A grandfather clause allows those 13 of the 524 K–12
districts that levied less than 18 mills prior to reform to levy only their previous
millage rate. The state supplements locally raised funds with state funds to
bring district spending up to the level determined by the foundation grant
formula.10
The new system represents both a tax shift and a tax cut. Property taxes
were cut sharply, income taxes were reduced somewhat, and sales taxes in-
creased but not by as much as other taxes fell. Table 2 provides detailed
information on the changes in state and local revenue associated with school
finance reform in 1995–1996, by which time the revenue changes are fully
9 Districts that are between $4200 and $5000 will have their per-pupil spending increase at a
considerably greater rate (up to twice) than the basic foundation allowance, until all districts
reach at least the basic foundation allowance. Note that most of the low-spending districts are
rural, and are also relatively low-cost districts. Thus, in real terms, the increase in spending per
pupil for these districts is understated by the actual changes.
10 Districts also have the option of levying three additional enhancement mills on all property in
their district. For the first 3 years of the new program (until 1997–1998) they may use the revenues
from these mills solely for their own purpose. After that time they must share the revenues with
other districts in their intermediate school district. Intermediate school districts are approximately
the size of counties.
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Table 2. Revenue changes from school finance reform, 1995–1996 (millions of dollars).
Property tax
Net decrease in school and other property tax ($4653)
New state education property tax (6 mills) 1113
Reduction in property tax credit due to tax cut 615
Other property tax changes (62)
Subtotal property tax ($2988)
Reduced income tax rate ($293)
Sales and use taxes
Increased tax rates from 4 to 6 percent $1962
Other sales tax changes 74
Subtotal sales and use taxes $2036
Increased tobacco taxes 387
Real estate transfer tax 111
Total change in state and local taxes ($747)
Memorandum: Estimated increase in federal taxes $380
Sources: Wortley and Towne [1996]; Senate Fiscal Agency [1994]; authors’ calculations.
implemented. For a sense of scale, personal income in the state in 1995 was
$224.7 billion, total state and local revenue in 1995–1996 is estimated at 24.8
billion, and total local property taxes for schools in 1993–1994, the last pre-
reform year, were $5.9 billion [Senate Fiscal Agency, 1995, 1996]. The net
property tax cut is thus on the order of 1 percent of personal income, 12 percent
of state and local tax revenue, and half of pre-reform property taxes. Finally,
it is worth noting that the Michigan reforms led to an increase in federal tax
liabilities; by and large, deductible taxes were reduced and nondeductible taxes
were increased. The Senate Fiscal Agency [1994] estimated that in 1994–1995
individual federal tax liabilities in Michigan were increased by $339 million
because of the reduction in property taxes. Scaling up to 1995–1996, the loss
of deductibility is worth about $380 billion. By choosing to substitute sales
taxes for property taxes, the state reduced its revenues by about twice as much
as it reduced the net taxes paid by its citizens.
EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS
Discussion of the reforms is complicated by the possibility that some of their
features may not be sustainable over the long run, and that the reforms are
likely to lead to changes in interdistrict distribution of property values and
population. Our discussion of the distributional effects of the reforms, deriving
both from changes in school spending levels and changes in tax structure,
assumes that the reforms will stay in place and that households will stay put.
It also ignores changes in property values. We then turn to the longer run
questions, including the effects of reform on the overall level and composition
of K–12 spending in the state. Throughout, we assume that the incidence of
the cut in state revenues is the same as the incidence of state spending generally
(which, absent better information, we implicitly assume to be proportional
to income).
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Expenditures at the District Level
Had the system been fully implemented in 1994–1995, the positive relationship
between wealth and expenditures11 that we reported for 1993–1994 would be
somewhat weaker, but still strong and significant. The univariate regression
coefficient on wealth falls from 0.0092 (with a standard error of 0.0004) under
the old system to 0.0070 (0.0004), assuming that the new system had been
fully implemented in 1994–1995.12 Mean spending per pupil was $5420 in
1993–1994 and would have been $5676 in 1994–1995 (the actual mean was
$5500). Overall, the new system increased average spending and reduced the
variance across districts and students; it also weakened the relationship be-
tween general operating expenditures and district property wealth. In addi-
tion, because the new system (when fully implemented) preserves nominal
and not real spending differences across districts, the variance among districts
will continue to drop as inflation decreases the value of the nominal differ-
ences.
The reform tends to equalize spending through the mechanism of bringing
the lowest spending districts up to the level of the basic foundation allowance,
while preserving the nominal difference between that level and actual spending
for all other districts. Because school spending per pupil is positively correlated
with income per capita, the incidence of the expenditure changes is progres-
sive. The average median household income of the districts that received real
spending increases (the districts that spent less than $5000 per pupil in 1993–
1994) was $27,710 in 1990, compared to $33,621 for districts that spent more
than $5000. Most of the beneficiaries on the expenditure side are residents
of relatively small, rural districts. Notably, four large, low-income urban
districts Detroit, Grand Rapids, Flint, and Lansing—received no benefits
from reform on the spending side, because they all spent more than $5000 per
pupil prior to reform. All of these districts had median incomes below $27,000
in 1990, and all of them, being urban districts, almost certainly faced higher
costs of production of educational services than did school districts on
average.13
Tax Incidence
Viewed from the perspective of the state as a whole, a reduction in property
taxes coupled with an increase in sales taxes would not be expected to have
much effect on overall tax incidence. Except for the property tax at the lowest
income levels, both taxes are somewhat regressive with respect to current
11 The proxy for expenditures used in these regressions is the revenue measure discussed in footnote
3, which explains why it is a fairly good proxy for cost-adjusted spending available to K–12 students
without special needs.
12 These regressions are based on 523 of the 524 K–12 districts in Michigan. Mackinac Island
Public Schools were not included because their per-pupil property value was substantially higher
than in any other district ($1,099,390 per pupil). Although Mackinac is part of the population of
Michigan school districts, the well-known power of outliers to shift regressions makes it misleading
to include it in an analysis that is meant to describe overall trends in the state. With Mackinac Island
included the slopes are 0.0081 (0.0003) pre-reform and 0.0063 (0.0003) with full implementation.
13 These calculations and those in the succeeding section are based on data from the The Integrated
Database on Michigan Education and from the National Center for Education Statistics School
District Database, which provides decennial census data for school districts.
Centralization of School Finance in Michigan / 123
income and approximately proportional with respect to lifetime income.14 But
the property tax cut in Michigan was variable on a number of dimensions.
First, homeowners generally received much larger cuts than did renters; except
in the 28 districts that permit local supplementation, homestead property tax
rates fell from an average of 34 mills to a uniform 6 mills. Renters did much
less well; rental property is taxed as nonhomestead property, which is now
taxed at 24 mills statewide. Because renters have lower incomes than home-
owners, this difference in property tax cuts is plainly regressive. The regressivity
of the cuts is compounded by the operation of the Michigan circuit breaker
which reduced the regressivity of the pre-reform property tax, and hence re-
duced the progressivity of reducing the property tax. Thus, while renters pay
their full share of the increased sales tax, their net tax reduction in any jurisdic-
tion was generally smaller (as a fraction of income) than that for homeowners.
As a group, renters are generally worse off as a consequence of the tax shift.
For homeowners in a given school district, the incidence of the property tax
cut with respect to permanent income is approximately proportional, once the
circuit breaker is taken into account. Across school districts, however, we need
to look at the relationship between income and the reduction in property tax
payments, which depends on the tax rate (reduced to a uniform six mills except
in the districts that can levy hold-harmless millages) and the tax base. No data
are available on the joint distribution of income and house value by school
district. To make a rough estimate of the incidence of the property tax cuts,
we calculated the average (per owner-occupied housing unit) property tax
reduction in each district as a fraction of the median household income in
that district. We then looked at the distribution of this statistic by income
quintile, excluding the 28 highest spending districts, whose tax rates still vary.
(This statistic is imperfect: It takes no account of the circuit breaker, so it
overstates the magnitude of the tax cut for the lower quintiles. In addition,
the median household income includes renters as well as homeowners. As long
as the relationship between the median household income and the median
homeowner’s income does not vary too much across income quintiles, however,
comparisons across quintiles will still be meaningful.)
The results are quite striking. For the bottom quintile (median household
income of $18,771 in 1990) the average property tax reduction per owner-
occupied home was 2.63 percent of median income. For the other four quintiles,
the average ranged from 3.23 percent to 3.78 percent, with no trend. Detroit,
with a median income of $18,742, is in the lowest quintile. The tax cut in
Detroit was 1.97 percent of median income, leaving the rest of the quintile
very near the average for the rest of the state. Given that sales taxes paid are
approximately proportional to permanent income, we conclude that for most
of the state the incidence of tax changes is approximately proportional. Citizens
of Detroit, however, surely saw a considerable increase in total taxes paid.
14 These conclusions are relatively uncontroversial for the sales tax [Slemrod and Bakija, 1996;
Fullerton and Rogers, 1993]. There is a wider range of opinion on the property tax, but we find
persuasive that the excise effects of a state or local residential property tax fall on consumption,
making the relevant issue the relationship between income and housing consumption. Fullerton
and Rogers find that housing consumption as a fraction of income is higher than average at the
lowest income levels, and then becomes approximately proportional to income. This is roughly
consistent with other theoretical and empirical work on the subject [see, for example, Ihlan-
feldt, 1982].
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At the same time, a group of the highest income citizens, residents of the
28 districts with the option to levy hold-harmless millages, also saw their total
taxes increase. This group had a median household income of $36,210 in 1990,
high in the fourth quintile of the income distribution. Their property taxes fell
by about 50 percent compared to an average reduction of 82 percent for the
state as a whole. The average tax cut as a fraction of median income for this
group was 2.16 percent, not very different from that of the city of Detroit, at
the other end of the income distribution.
What Will Happen to the Basic Foundation Allowance?
Our concern here is with the longer run. Spending in all districts in Michigan
is now keyed to the basic foundation allowance. By legislation, the basic foun-
dation allowance is determined by SAFI, but what legislation does, legislation
can undo, and the trade-off between school spending and other parts of the
state budget is sure to arise again in the future. To address the question of the
effect of Michigan’s reforms on the level of school spending in the state we
draw on Loeb [1996], which shows that foundation grant systems that allow
limited supplementation (as does Michigan) may avoid the most serious diffi-
culties that arise under uniform foundation grants with no supplementation
and with unlimited supplementation.
Uniform Foundation Grants
The great advantage of uniform foundation grants is that they equalize spend-
ing across districts. The great disadvantage is that they eliminate all local
control. Under a system of district funding voters can, to at least some degree,
‘‘vote with their feet’’ and choose their district of residence to receive close to
the level of spending on schools that they prefer given the tax price they must
pay for education.15 Under uniform state finance, on the other hand, many
voters are likely to be off their demand curve for school spending. Figure 1
illustrates the distribution of funding in Michigan prior to reform. The skewed
distribution, with a number of students in high-spending districts receiving
substantially more funding than the median for the state, suggests that resi-
dents of high-spending districts are especially likely to be far from their pre-
ferred spending in a system of pure state funding with equal state grants. This
assumes that there is a social choice mechanism that results in grant levels
close to that preferred by the median (or even the mean) voter in the state.16
As a result, a switch from local funding to uniform state funding is often
15 This assumption requires, among other things, that there be many communities that individuals
can choose to live in, and thus is generally more realistic for large metropolitan areas than for
sparsely populated rural areas. It has some empirical support. Gramlich and Rubinfeld [1982],
using data from Michigan, found evidence of such grouping of people with similar demands,
especially in the urban centers. Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro [1982] and Rubinfeld, Shapiro,
and Roberts [1987] also found evidence of Tiebout sorting in their microestimates of elasticities
of demand for public school spending.
16 The median-voter assumption has been both used and analyzed in numerous studies including
Gramlich and Rubinfeld [1982] and Inman [1987]. Romer and Rosenthal [1982, 1979] point out
potential shortcomings of the median-voter model. For the median voter to be the decisive voter
the decisions must be made in single-issue majority rule processes and preferences must be single-
peaked. Courant and Rubinfeld [1987] argue that if there is logrolling the mean preference may
be decisive. Even so, with a high-skewed distribution, high outliers will be far from the social choice.
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Figure 1. The distribution of per-pupil spending under the power equalization system
1993–1994 (1995 dollars).
politically difficult. Raising all school spending to the level of the highest
spending district is invariably financially infeasible, whereas forcing districts
to reduce spending on schools, although not impossible [see the California
case as described by Downes, 1992, and Silva and Sonstelie, 1995], is likely to
be unpopular especially in high-wealth, and often politically powerful, districts.
Figure 2 illustrates a case in which high-demand districts will drop out of
the system altogether, and choose private schools. The level of uniform state
spending (point B in the figure) is far from the level that would be chosen at
the local tax price (point A). The voter-consumer depicted in Figure 2 will
maximize utility by sending her child to a private school (point C) even though
she is still financing an expenditure of B in the public schools. Residents who
choose private schools will have little incentive to support public funding for
education, and will attempt to push the uniform foundation grant downward.
State Grants with Unlimited Local Supplements
The second system, equal state grants with unlimited local supplementation,
has many advocates [see, for example, Ladd and Yinger, 1994]. This system
has the intuitive appeal of retaining much local control over funding decisions
on the margin while insuring an ‘‘adequate’’ level of financing for all districts.
However, these ostensible benefits may not be possible to sustain, because
voters from districts with high wealth are likely to press for low foundation
grants (in the limit, zero) and large supplementation because (assuming that
the sources of state finance are highly correlated with wealth) their tax price
is lower at the district level than it is at the state level.
The problem is illustrated in Figure 3. The tax price for a dollar of spending
per pupil is higher at the state than district level for residents of high-wealth
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Figure 2. High-demand individuals may prefer private schooling given a system of
low-uniform state grants.
districts (the dashed line in Figure 3 reflects the district tax price while the
steeper, dotted line reflects the state tax price). Any positive state funding shifts
the intercept of the (solid) local budget line in and thus will result in lower
utility (point B) than if there were no state funding (point A). Voters whose
circumstances are depicted in Figure 3 will generally support zero or low
foundation grants. (This analysis assumes that voters have sufficient mobility
so that voters within a district have fairly similar demands for schooling at
the local tax price.)
The extent to which residents of higher wealth districts can push the founda-
tion level down will depend on their number and political influence, but we
expect that higher wealth voters have influence in higher proportion than their
number. If so, state funding levels will generally be pushed even lower than
the distribution of tax prices facing all potential voters would suggest, because
voters from high-wealth districts will prefer lower levels of state funding while
voters from low-wealth districts will prefer the same as in a pure state funding
system. Thus, a system of state grants with unlimited local supplementation
may allow so much local control over funding decisions that it will provide
little if any cross-district equalization. Under such a system, the level of the
foundation grant will generally be lower than is the case with either uniform
grants or limited supplementation.
Limited Local Supplementation
Finally, consider systems of foundation grants with limited local supplementa-
tion. Again, voters from low-wealth districts will prefer that funding come
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Figure 3. Residents of high-wealth districts (whose local tax price exceeds their state
tax price for a dollar of education spending per pupil) are likely to prefer little or no
state funding under a system of foundation grants with unlimited local supplementation.
from state sources while those from high-wealth districts will prefer that fund-
ing come from local sources. However, to the extent that voters from high-
wealth districts will be limited in the revenues they can raise locally, the only
way that they can obtain the higher levels of school spending that they desire
will be through positive state funding. Depending on the details of the system,
the resulting level of state funding is likely to be somewhere in between those
provided by the two other systems. In Figure 4, unlike Figure 3, the residents
of high-wealth districts prefer the larger foundation grant (point A) to the
smaller one (point B).
In addition, because some supplementation is allowed, residents of high-
demand districts are likely to be closer to their optimum level of spending
than they would be under a uniform foundation grant. Thus, while sacrificing
equity relative to uniform state funding, a system of limited supplementation
may be more acceptible politically than a pure state funding system, especially
to residents of high-demand, high-wealth districts who are pushed far from
their demand curve when no supplementation is allowed. (Of course, such
residents would prefer a system with no foundation grants and complete local
control even more, but this choice is unlikely to become available. One can
also image combining the analyses of Figure 2 and Figure 4 to show circum-
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Figure 4. Under a system of state grants with limited local supplementation even
residents of high-wealth districts are likely to prefer positive state funding levels.
stances under which voters would ‘‘jump’’ to a private school equilibrium in
preference to limited supplementation. However, the set of circumstances un-
der which this would happen will be smaller under limited supplementation
than under uniform state finance.)
Michigan
In this light, two elements of the new system particularly stand out: the limited
supplementation allowed in previously high-spending districts and the differ-
ence in foundation grant levels provided to the districts in general. Both of
these elements arose from political pressures and the desire not to reduce
funding to schools in any district while avoiding the fiscal impossibility of
equalizing spending at a very high level. As it happens, both of these elements
also tend to lead the high-spending districts to support a reasonably high basic
foundation allowance, because by doing so, they can keep their spending about
where they had previously shown they wanted it to be.
Michigan’s supplementation is limited in two ways: Only some districts may
supplement and each of those may supplement by a fixed dollar amount. The
choice of $6500 as the level of prior spending above which supplementation is
permitted may contribute to maintaining the balance between high foundation
grant levels and political stability. Figure 1 shows that the small number of
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districts that chose spending levels above $6500 tended to choose levels well
beyond this figure. Thus, the choice of $6500 for the cutoff allows most districts
with substantially greater demand than the median to supplement while re-
taining the benefits of a pure state funding system among the rest of the voters,
most of whom are likely to receive close to their preferred level of school
funding in a system of pure state finance. Overall, the supplementation element
of the new system may then enhance the stability of the foundation grant
level, although the different treatment of different districts may lead to other
problems that we will discuss.
Migration and Capitalization
In the long run, the new system will have effects on the distribution of the
population across districts and, via capitalization, on the value of property.
After reform, an individual’s tax price for schooling (except in the 28 districts
that can supplement using local resources) is independent of district residence.
The shift from local to state funding thus removes one benefit of living in a
high-wealth district and may result in an incentive for residents to leave such
districts, reducing property values.17 Similarly, districts that used to have high
millage rates will become more attractive, and people will tend to migrate
toward them, bidding property values up. Because schooling accounts for such
a large share of local public spending, these capitalization and migration effects
are unlikely to be significantly mitigated via the finance of other public goods
whose tax price still depends on local property wealth.
Capitalization and migration may prove to be especially important in districts
(notably Detroit) that saw large reductions in millage rates and that have a
significant stock of structurally sound housing with low-market prices. In this
case, the reduction in millage rates will make housing in such districts more
attractive to relatively high-income households, even if those households would
not send their children to public schools. Basically, the reduction in millage
rates in such districts will make private schools more attractive for potential
residents, by reducing the cost of residing in the district.
We have not seen any trace of significant population redistribution in the
wake of the reforms, and we have not yet been able to obtain any data that
would allow us to evaluate the extent of capitalization of the tax changes. In
the short and medium term, our instinct is to expect to see more capitalization
than migration, because in general the tax liability associated with living in
each district will have changed, but except for the lowest spending districts,
school spending will not have changed. The incidence of these changes in
property values will parallel that of the tax changes themselves, which we
discussed earlier.
In the longer run, migration will put some stress on the state budget. In the
range of $5000 to $6500 of spending per pupil (in 1993–1994) school spending
is now independent of local taxes. Thus, the higher spending districts in this
range will become relatively more attractive, and in some combination there
17 If all nonresidential property is perfectly mobile, no benefit will have been derived in the first
place, and there will be no such effect [Gordon, 1986]. The strong positive association between
nonresidential SEV and spending per pupil in pre-reform Michigan (coefficient of 0.0076 with a
t-statistic of 16.5), however, leads us to the conclusion that residents believe that on average the
presence of nonresidential property reduces their tax price under the property tax, implying that
such property is not perfectly mobile.
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will be increased school populations and higher property values in these dis-
tricts. The movement of the school-age population away from lower spending
districts towards higher spending districts will increase the average foundation
grant, and hence increase the cost of school finance at the state level.
Other Effects
Fiscal Substitution
We expect to see fiscal substitution in formerly low-spending districts experi-
encing large increases in revenues for operating expenditures. A number of
districts received rapid increases in operating revenues as a result of the re-
forms. Onaway, for example, saw an increase of over 23 percent between
1993–1994 and 1994–1995 and will continue to receive large increases for the
next few years. Because the change in revenue is so great, the value of an extra
dollar for operating expenditures will not be worth a dollar of tax reduction or
other public spending in many of these districts. Attempts at fiscal substitution,
disguising other expenditures (both school and nonschool) as school operating
expenditures, is then likely. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may already
be happening, though reliable data on district expenditures is not yet available.
In Onaway, for example, increased operating funds are being used partly for
roofing projects and new buses.18
Hold-Harmless Millages
The 28 districts that can supplement their foundation grants are required to
levy their supplemental (hold-harmless) millages on homestead property only,
up to the point where the total millage on such property equals the 24 mills
imposed on nonhomestead property. In over half of these districts, nonhome-
stead property accounts for more than half of all taxable property, implying
a substantial increase in the marginal tax price of public schooling (assuming
residents do not bear most of the tax burden on nonhomestead property in
their district). Because of this increased tax price, in our earlier study, Courant,
Gramlich, and Loeb [1995], we predicted that the demand for supplemental
spending would be below the cap in a number of these previously high-spending
districts. Contrary to our earlier predictions, in both years that the new system
has been in effect, all districts that face apparent increases in their marginal
tax prices have chosen to levy their maximum permitted amount. We do not
have a very good explanation. It may be that voters are slow to notice their
tax price change, especially since the actual millage rate is now lower than it
was pre-reform. It may take a millage vote or two for voters to see that the
marginal price of a dollar’s worth of spending per pupil has increased.
SAFI and the State Budget
Much of the recent debate in Michigan has been about total state spending,
and has taken the form of a technical debate about the value of the School
Aid Fund Index (SAFI). As passed by the legislature in 1994, SAFI automatically
determines spending per pupil, district by district, every year (subject to the
vagaries of the 28 districts that have some choice over spending levels). Given
18 Personal communication with the superintendent of Onaway schools.
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the political importance of school spending, it would not be surprising to
discover that the legislature would like to reconsider the automatic nature of
this process. This already seems to have happened. There appears to be enough
ambiguity in how SAFI is measured, particularly in how the student population
is measured, to get substantial disagreement over what level of funding SAFI
implies. For the coming year, the executive branch arrived at a $113 increase,
while the legislature came up with $166.
Because we do not have data available to determine what the ‘‘true’’ index
should be, we do not know whether the legislature is simply trying to increase
funds for K–12 or if the governor is trying to decrease them. Either (hence
both) seems plausible. Michigan is currently enjoying both relative economic
prosperity and relatively low taxes. In these circumstances voters may be willing
to spend more on schools than dictated by the ‘‘true’’ level of SAFI. Not apparent
in the current controversy, but potentially important over the longer run, is
the possibility that voters may want to smooth school spending over the busi-
ness cycle, spending more than SAFI allows during recessions and less during
economic upturns. (As Fisher and Wassmer [1995] have noted, SAFI will make
overall school spending much more responsive to the business cycle than were
property tax revenues.) More fundamentally, the rigidity of an index such as
SAFI does not allow for demand changes over time. For all of these reasons,
it seems unlikely that the fully automatic application of SAFI to determine the
level of school spending will survive politically, although the formula may
continue to be a focal point for determining the annual basic foundation al-
lowance.
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The new finance system was organized so that the vast majority of school
students would have access to increased educational resources in the years
immediately following reform. This was accomplished without bankrupting
the state government by use of these clever tricks, the third of which is really
a piece of good luck:
● The new system set the permitted amount of spending in all districts (and
the actual amount, controlled by the state in the form of a foundation
grant, in all but 28) to be at least somewhat higher than spending was in
the last year prior to reform.
● Where the system permits districts to supplement the state-provided foun-
dation grant, it limits the amount of supplementation allowed.
● Because of robust economic growth in the state during the period of
reform, spending on schools could be increased, and overall taxes reduced,
without significant real reductions in other parts of the state budget. The
fiscal costs of the reforms have been easy to hide so far.
The first trick is the standard stuff of grandfather clauses: Set things up so
that no one is worse off, at least for a while. In the context of school finance,
where a history of local control and migration tended to put households some-
where near their demand curves prior to reform, the grandfather provision
keeps everyone near their demand curves after reform, at least for a while—a
feature that has much to recommend it. There has been very little in the way
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of general complaint that districts would like to tax themselves to spend more
(at least so far) because the current spending levels are still close to those that
the districts voluntarily chose when they could tax themselves to spend more.
Over time, of course, this feature of the new system will become increasingly
irrelevant, as people move, incomes change, and the like. Over time, then, we
expect to see an increasing number of districts press the state for a restoration
of local control, probably in the form of a right to supplement their foundation
grants. To the extent that such districts are successful, depending on the
amount of supplementation allowed, they may then also want to reduce the
level of foundation grants in general, for the reasons we have discussed earlier.
(Districts that would prefer lower spending, meanwhile, are unlikely to press
for a reduction in their grants, as they would be very unlikely to get the
difference in cash. Rather, they will become increasingly creative about finding
ways to spend money that can be put in the school budget but that can achieve
a variety of other purposes.)
The second innovative feature of the Michigan reform, limited supplementa-
tion permitted in some districts, holds some real promise as a policy that other
states might want to try. One of the problems with foundation systems is that
some districts want to spend more than the foundation grant. The usual solu-
tion to this problem that has been proposed in the economic literature, local
supplementation, has the difficulty that high-demand communities may be-
come a coalition for low foundation grants, compromising the ability of the
foundation system to deliver equity. By limiting the amount of supplementation
permitted by high-demand districts, these districts can be induced to support
relatively high foundation grants, because this is the only way they can get
anywhere near their preferred spending level. The mechanism design problem
here is tricky: Allow ‘‘too much’’ supplementation and a low foundation grant
will be chosen. Allow ‘‘too little,’’ and the high-demand districts can opt for
private education and, again, will not support much of a statewide foundation
grant. We do not yet know how much room there is in-between, but there may
be some: The question seems well worth exploring, and the exploration could
be productively generalized to consider limited supplementation in all districts.
The reforms did a great deal to raise spending in low-spending districts, and
the distributional effect of this change is surely progressive. The effect of the
reforms on relatively low-income areas, most notably Detroit, was less positive.
Detroit residents saw net tax increases, on average, and no spending increases.
Moreover, urban districts generally face higher costs than do districts on aver-
age, and the reforms made no effort to compensate for these cost differences.
ber of other elements of the Michigan reforms could also have been done
better. Given that the property tax had to be cut for political reasons, we find
it puzzling that the voters of the state chose to substitute the nondeductible
sales tax rather than the deductible income tax. The cost to the state’s taxpayers,
as we have noted, is over 1 percent of state general revenues. For the usual
reasons, we find assessment caps to be a poor way of reducing property taxes.
They tend to lead to inefficiency in the housing market, as people become
locked-in to both their current homes and low assessments following periods
of inflation or growth in real property values. There is no good efficiency or
equity reason for the tax system to favor people who happen to have been in
their homes when property values were rising. The assessment cap will also
put a strain on municipal tax bases. We appreciate the political necessity to
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cut property taxes, but it is unclear to us why an assessment cap was required
in the context of an enormous cut in property tax rates.
Perhaps the most important feature of the Michigan reforms is that they
happened, and they seem to be holding together. The political debate on schools
has shifted from a discussion centered on how to cut property taxes to one that
includes consideration of the content of the curriculum, the state’s achievement
testing program, and the structure of charter schools. All of this is to the good;
the purpose of school finance is to provide the means to educate students, and
it is our hope that the reforms will allow attention to be moved to what should
have been the central policy issue all along.
Some Clouds on the Distant Horizon
In political terms, it is hard to see how the reforms could be more successful.
The local property tax, the reduction of which has been the most difficult
political issue in the state for a generation, has been dramatically reduced.
Small, low-spending rural school districts that looked to be on the edge of
bankruptcy enjoy fiscal health for the foreseeable future. The vast majority of
districts are spending slightly more per pupil than they did pre-reform. Yet
we see some clouds on the horizon:
● The loss of local control over spending will become increasingly noticeable
over time, as the district-by-district demands for school spending diverge
from the last pre-reform year (1993–1994) that was the basis for setting
spending levels.
● With school spending determined largely by state-level revenue sources,
the next recession is likely to make the trade-off between school spending
and the rest of the state budget much more salient than was ever the case
when the local property tax was the principal source of school finance.
● There is the possibility that voters in districts at the low end of the founda-
tion grant distribution will notice that other districts are receiving up to
$1500 a year per pupil more than they are, and will press for a more
uniform system of finance. Should this lead to a uniform foundation grant,
residents of higher spending districts would almost certainly be forced
off of their demand curves, leading to further pressure for local supplemen-
tation or other local control.
Pressure for Increased Local Control
The first problem will emerge gradually, and will lead, we think, to increasing
pressure to permit local supplementation in more districts. Alternatively, if
the charter school provisions associated with the reforms lead to significant
growth of charter schools, it is possible that pressures for more local control
will be accommodated by providing more support to the charter schools.19 The
19 In conjunction with school finance reform, Michigan established a system of charter schools.
The system is similar to a public school voucher system. Organizers of charter schools obtain a
foundation grant from the state equal to the relevant district’s foundation grant or $5500 per
pupil, whichever is less. (The local public school district loses the foundation grant attributable
to students who go to a charter school, unless the charter school is run by the local district.) It
is too early to tell what the quantitative importance of charter schools will be, and a number of
court cases have established that charter schools will be subject to many of the same regulatory
requirements (notably regarding certification of teachers) as public schools. The governor is a
strong supporter of the charter school movement.
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balance of political power in the state when the issue of local control emerges
will likely be very important. If the Democrats are in charge, one would expect
to see an extension of local supplementation beyond the 28 districts now
permitted to levy hold-harmless millages. If the Republicans are still in control
and charter schools have proved to be successful, we would expect to see
increased emphasis on the charter schools.
The Business Cycle
Michigan’s economy is more prone than most to the business cycle, and both
the School Aid Fund and the rest of the state budget will be quite responsive
to an economic downturn. Thus, the time will likely come when either expendi-
tures per pupil or the rest of state spending will have to fall in real terms. This
will put stress on the polity, as recessions always do, but the stress will be
compounded, relative to years past, for two reasons. First, the reduced impor-
tance of property taxes and increased importance of sales and income taxes
make school finance (and total state and local revenues) more responsive to
the business cycle than they used to be. Second, local school districts in the
new system will not be able to compensate for reduced foundation grants by
increasing local taxes. At the state level, Michigan has had a long history of
accumulating surpluses (termed ‘‘rainy day funds’’) in good years, and spending
them when times are tough. We would not be surprised to see an earmarked
rainy day fund for the schools emerge. We would also not be surprised to see
cyclically induced fiscal stress add to the pressures to permit local supplemen-
tation.
Overall Stability of the Reforms
In any case, we would be very surprised if the two key elements of the reforms—
reduced property taxation and centralization of financing (and hence of expen-
diture determination)— were reversed. For one thing, radical reform is gener-
ally unlikely, as witnessed by the 12 failed ballot proposals that preceded
Michigan’s reform. (We do not expect to see another game of chicken played
out on the senate floor.) There is no constituency, now or on the horizon, for
a return to greatly increased dependence on local property taxes statewide,
and no other source of local finance has ever been made available to school
districts. The main question for the longer term is the level of resources that
can be sustained by a centralized system when it competes directly with the
rest of the state budget. So far, the schools have done well, but in this matter,
as in almost all elements of the Michigan political economy, we will need
to see at least one full business cycle before we dare to predict the more
distant future.
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